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ABSTRACT
The thesis is a study of the security problems due to
street crime in the Longwood Medical Area of Boston. The
first part of the thesis defines the theories and practices
of environmental security planning, the urban design synop-
tic approach to crime prevention. The environment is ex-
amined in its totality -- the physical, social, economic,
and psychological characteristics, all of which are consi-
dered. The synoptic approach incorporates some of the
traditional forms of crime prevention: the punitive (mini-
mally), corrective and mechanical approaches with emphasis
on the spatial perspective and the utilization of physical
design strategies to deter crime. A "crime analysis model"
is developed which focuses on five components: the offen-
der, the journey to crime, the target, natural surveillance
and organized surveillance.
The second part is the case study of the Longwood
Medical Area (LMA) for which the crime analysis model forms
the structure. The currently practised monolithic approach
to crime prevention which primarily restricts itself to
the utilization of organized surveillance (private security
guards) and limits itself to the defined geographical boun-
daries of the LMA is examined. This monlithic approach
is aggravated by the lack of inter-institutional-community
tensions all of which result in an unsatisfactory security
planning strategy.
The main recommendation of the thesis focuses on a
basic conceptual change to a synoptic approach in the
security planning of the Longwood Medical Area. A number
of recommendations applying to specific situations are
given.
Thesis Superv.isor: Gary Hack
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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1Introduction
Ensuring the security of our cities is no longer a
task relegated to the department of criminal justice or
the law enforcement agencies. The tremendous increase of
street crime over the past few decades are indicators of
the incapability of the traditional law enforcement
establishment to contain the problem. Violent personal
assaults -- murders, rapes, and robberies -- have more
than quadrupled inthe last twenty years.1 Crimes against
property -- larceny, car theft, and vandalism -- have
tripled, resulting in billions of dollars of losses.
The fear of crime is as crippling to the quality of
American urban life as the actual risk of victimization.
Large percentages of the population do not.venture out
alone at night,2 entire districts are avoided,3 and a
In 1980, 23,000 people died at the hands of murderers, up
from 9,000 two decades earlier. In 1980, 82,000 women
were raped, up from 17,000 reported in 1960; more than
half a million people were robbed, up from 108,000; and
650,000 were assaulted, up from 154,000.
"Our Losing Battle Against Crime," U.S. News and World
Report, October 12, 1981, pp. 39-43.
2A 1972 poll showed that at least 50% of persons with the
following demographic characteristics were afraid to walk
the street alone at night: females, people with grade
school education, income less than $3,000, and residents
of cities with at least one million inhabitants. U.S.
Department of Justice, 1975:9.
3 Savitz et al. found that 31% of the black adults surveyed
reported trying to transfer their children to safer schools,
while 70% reported trying not to work in "bad" areas.
2migration of urban residents to rural areas seeking "peace-
fulness, tranquility and freedom from the fear of serious
crime"4 is a growing phenomenon.
The outcome is an informal decentralization of law
enforcement activities: vigilante groups such as the
Guardian Angels ride the subways and patrol the streets of
35 cities across the nation; neighborhood block associations
and community crime prevention groups are growing innumber;
institutions are enlarging their security systems. In the
past twenty years national expenditures on private security
have increased tenfold -- from $900 million in 1960 to an
estimated $10 billion in 1981.5
There are also new professionals who have entered the
crime prevention field: urban designers. Environmental
security planning, the urban design approach to crime pre-
vention, attempts to reduce both the opportunities and the
motivations for street crime through physical and socio-
economic planning. The approach is synoptic in that it
(3 cont'd) Savits, L.D. et al., City Life andDelinquency-
Victimization, Fear of Crime and Gang Membership, National
Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Crime Prevention, LEAA, 1977.
4 Peterson, I., "Rural Michigan Booming as Many Flee Urban
Ills," New York Times, July 8, 1981.
5
"Violence Creates a New Growth Industry," Chicago Tribune,
April 5, 1981.
3draws on the contribution of all related professionals and
members of the community for the planning process and its
implementation.
This thesis is an environmental security planning
study of the Longwood Medical Area of Boston, a world re-
known medical andeducational center covering an area of 154
acres. The Longwood Medical Area (LMA) attributes the
street crime difficulties it faces to its location "in an
undesirable neighborhood." This problem is one shared by
major institutions across the country which are often
located in low income communities plagued with high crime
rates. The LMA administrators have recognized, along with
many of the administrators of institutions across the nation,
that "security is an issue for which the institutions must
plan."6
Background for the Study
In December 1981, Arrowstreet, Inc., architects and
planners, were retained by the Medical Area Services Corpo-
ration (MASCO), a shared service organization for thirteen
6
Dr. Mitch Rabkin, Director, Beth Israel Hospital, Longwood
Medical Area, Boston.
4of the major institutions in the LMA, to conduct an urban
design master program for the area.8 The primary area-wide
issues of concern were traffic and parking, security and
physical plant development. This thesis is an outgrowth
of my involvement with the LMA master program as an urban
design team member.
7The MASCO member institutions are: Beth Israel.Hospital
(BI), Brigham and Women's Hospital (B&W), Children's Hospi-
tal Medical Center (CHMC), Joslin Diabetes Foundation,
Sidney Farber Cancer Institute, Harvard Medical School
(HMS), Harvard School of Dental Medicine, Harvard School
of Public Health, Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and
Allied Health Sciences (MCP), Simmons College and Winsor
School. (Exhibit 7, pp. 32)
8 The following definition of Master Programming is excerpted
from the MASCO Project Plan, 1980, pp. 1.
"'Master programming' is fundamentally different from
traditional master planning. Master programming refers to
environmental planning in a broad sense to include social,
institutional and non-land use environmental factors as
well as those traditionally associated with physical plan-
ning. Whereas master planning usually implies working
from a larger framing idea or plan, master programming is
meant to imply an action-centered approach in which framing
ideas or plans are drawn to improve the fit of actions with
others taken or planned."
5Thesis Format
An overview of environmental security planning and
related crime prevention approaches provides the background
for the crime-analysis model, a model of the conditions and
their inter-relationships which contributa to the commission
of a street crime. The crime-analysis model provides a
structure for examination of the Longwood Medical Area
and for the conditions which contribute to the vulnerability
and desirability of the LMA as a target for street crime.
A critique of the security planning strategies current-
ly in force in the LMA is followed by a set of recommenda-
tions for future planning efforts.
The thesis concludes with a reflection on the importance
of the synoptic approach to environmental security planning
and recommendations for further research.
6SECTION A
Environmental Security Planning
"'...Allof these things (physical crime
control measures and law enforcement)
are symptomatic treatment of the funde-
mental problems of dealing with crime
in an urban society. We need to look
at a more deep seated structural change
in society if we are able to have any
major impact in a reasonable time span
on the causes and-problems of crime."
Joseph P. Cootes
Seminar on Urban Design
and Crime, 1972.
7I. Environmental Security Planning: Theory
A. Overview
Criminologists view the committing of street crime as
a rational decision by an individual who possesses both the
motivation and the opportunity to commit the crime.
9
Accordingly, traditional crime prevention approaches focus
either on reducing the offender's motivation for criminal
behavior or on reducing his opportunities for criminal
behavior. A synoptic approach to crime prevention attempts
to both reduce the motivations as well as the opportunities
for crime, in a comprehensive manner.
Environmental security planning is the urban design
approach to crime prevention. Urban design, as defined by
Kulski, is not merely the physical design of cities, but
rather a "synoptic" approach to city planning and urban
development.
9Criminogenesis, the study of why individuals adopt a life
of crime has produced varying theories, some of which are
mutually exclusive. Genetic and biological theories of
crime, for example, which argue that individuals are "born
criminals" are not dealt with in this thesis.
8... Design is an expression of a way of
life; of political, social, and legal
institutions; and of peoples... .it is
not possible to have physical design
distinct from other social components.
Design must include all factors that 10
make up a city.
Environmental security planning is, therefore by defi-
.11
nition, a synoptic approach to crime prevention. Environ-
mental security planning considers the environment in its
totality -- the social, economic, physical, legal, cultural
and psychological characteristics which contribute to the
occurrence of street crime. The unique contribution of
the urban designer, however, is the spatial perspective in
the study of crime and the manipulation of physical design
to deter crime.
10Kulski, Land of Urban Promise, University of Notre Dame
Press, 1967. Note: this definition is consistent with
that of "master programming," see p. 4.
l1 The term "environmental security planning" is adopted
from Richard Gardiner's Design for Safe Neighborhoods:
The Environmental Security Planning Process. Gardiner
advocates a comprehensive approach to crime prevention
including physical, social, economic and law enforcement
measures. It is not clear from Gardiner's manual whether
his definition of comprehensivity includes the reduction
of the motivations for crime in addition to the reduction
of the opportunities for crime. I have taken the liberty
to include criminal motivation and its mitigation as an
integral part of the environmental security planning
process.
Gardiner, R., Design for Safe Neighborhoods: The Environ-
mental Security Planning Process, U.S. Department of
Criminal Justice, LEAA, Washington, D.C. , 1978.
9Security planning strategies incorporated in a synop-
tic approach extend beyond the usual parameters of the urban
design profession. An environmental security planning pro-
cess, therefore, requires the establishment of a centralized
planning body to coordinate the activities of the various
professionals (architects, criminologists, economists,
health care specialists, geographers, planners, sociologists,
psychologists), policy makers (public and private), law
enforcement agencies, community groups and government offi-
cials whose cooperation determine the fiscal, political
and administrative support for the planning process and
the feasibility of its realization. The integration of
professional and non-professional actors in planning for
crime prevention is espoused by William Clifford:
It may be trite to say that human nature
and social relations cannot be divided be-
tween those who are paid to deal with crime
and those who aren't. However, crime, no
matter how it is defined, is concerned with
behavior, and criminal behavior knows no
sectoral boundaries... Its (crime's) intru-
sion into the routine work of education,
health, welfare, industry, forestry, agri-
culture and government itself attract too
little attention. Thinking of planning
crime prevention intersectorally or cross-
sectorally, however, involves us in a con-
sideration of these wider perspective.
12 Clifford, W., Planning Crime Prevention, Australian
Institute of Criminology, Lexington Books, Mass, 1976,
p. 23.
10
B. Crime Prevention
Environmental security planning draws on the three
traditional forms of crime prevention: the punitive and
corrective approaches aimed at reducing the motivations for
crime and the mechanical approach aimed at reducing the
opportunities for crime.
1. Reducing the Motivations for Crime
The punitive approach. The punitive approach deals with
the punishment an offender will receive if apprehended
and convicted. The criminal justice system is based upon
the premise that severe penalties will deter crime. Empiri-
cal evidence, however, suggests that it is the certainty
and not the severity of the punishment which engenders
the greatest deterrent effect. Given the high proportion
of criminals who are not apprehended,13 let alone convicted,
the efficacy of the punitive approach is seriously limited.
Though the realm of the environmental security plan-
ning activities does not enter that of the criminal justice
system, the effectiveness of the crime prevention measures
1 3 Arrests are made in only 19% of the serious crimes reported
to the police.
"Our Losing Battle Against Crime," U.S. News and World
Report, October 12, 1981, p. 39.
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recommended to increase the actual and perceived risk of
apprehension of the offender is affected by the ability of
the punitive system to serve as a crime deterrent. Most
experts agree that one reason for the steady rise in law-
breaking is "the brutal fact: (that) criminals today run
only a slight risk of being punished for any particular
crime and they know it."1 4
The corrective approach. There are numerous theories of
criminogenesis, the study of why individuals adopt a life
of crime. These include psychodynamic, genetic, and socio-
logical theories of criminal behavior. The most widely
accepted modern approaches to understanding crime, however,
have arisen out of the sociological perspective which main-
tains that "man's behavior is largely a product of social
forces and societal interactions and the roles one chooses
or becomes labeled with by society."1 5
The corrective approach from a sociological perspec-
tive attempts to modify the motivations for criminal be-
havior by dissipating the crime inducive influences in
society which indirectly contribute to crime. Research
1 4
"Our Losing Battle Against Crime," U.S. News and World
Report, October 29, 1981, p. 39.
1 5 Carter, R.I., et al., The Criminal's Image of the City,
Pergammon Press, New York, 1979, p.2.
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has shown that crime is correlated with characteristics
such as substandard housing, high percentage of rental
units in a neighborhood, unemployment and low family in-
come.16 See exhibit 1.
Crime
Income Poverty
I IUnemployment Race
Broken Urban
Hbmes Residences
I I
Education Hous ing
Health .
Exhibit 1.
Correlates of Crime
Opportunity policy measures (programs such as Headstart,
OEO, manpower training, mobilization for youth) and environ-
mental policy measures (such as the development of low rent
public housing, urban renewal, municipal sanitation, and
municipal leisure time programs) attempt to provide greater
equity for low income groups and minorities within the
opportunity structure of American society.
Studies evaluating these programs have reported signi-
ficant crime reduction resulting from environmental policy
measures. On the other hand, opportunity policy measures
16 Cordrey, J.B., Crime and Community - Crime Prevention
Policies, U.S. Department of Justice, LEAA, 1973.
1 7Jeffrey, C.R., Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design, Sage Publications, 1971, p. 197.
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have shown little evidence of contributing to crime dimu-
nition. Critics of the corrective approach contend that
social programs, while of merit unto themselves, have
minimal, if any, effect on crime rate reduction since the
relationship between crime and the demographic characteris-
tics is not causal but only correlative. However, proponents
of the opportunity policy programs argue that the programs
are conceptually sound and politically progressive and that
their failure is to be attributed to the lack of sufficient
funding. The programs reached a stage of virtual abandon-
ment in the late 1960's.
1 8
2. Reducing the Opportunities for Crime
In a study of burglar crime patterns, Phelan et al.
concluded that,
...the major deterrent for the burglar
(and these authors assume for other types
of crime also) is fear of surveillance:
of being seen or heardby residents, 19
passersby, or patrol personnel.
1 8 Cho, Y.N., Public Policy and Urban Crime, University of
Akron, Ballinger Publishing Co., p. 202.
1 9Phelan, G.F., Testing Architecturally Defensible Design:
How Burglars Perceive Cues of Residential Vulnerability.
Paper presented at the meeting of the American Society of
Criminology, Atlanta, Georgia, 1977, p. 15.
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Crime prevention measures to reduce the opportunities for
crime concentrate on increasing the risk of apprehension
by intensifying the surveillance of the area.
The mechanical approach. The mechanical approach utilizes
"target hardening" techniques which place impediments to
crime via access control -- gates, locks, and other hard-
ware -- and increases the risk of apprehension through
'organized surveillance" -- the stationing of security
guards and police patrols.
The environmental design approach to crime prevention
evolved from the mechanical approach. This approach
utilizes physical design measures to increase the risk
of apprehension through "natural surveillance" -- the
surveillance of the exterior grounds by the general public
and residents of the area.
Jane Jacobs, one of the early proponents of natural
surveillance as a crime preventative measure, maintains
that multi-use urban environments are secure for they
generate street activity throughout the day and night. The
natural surveillance by the public, which she terms "eyes
200
on the street", 2 increases the perceived risk of appre-
2 0Jacobs, J., The Death and Life of Great American Cities,
Random House, New York, 1961.
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hension to offenders, as well as the actual risk if on-
lookers are willing to intervene in times of crisis.
Jacobs contends that,
The sidewalk and street peace of cities
is not kept primarily by the police...
it is kept by an intricate, almost un-
conscious network of voluntary controls
and standards among the people themselves, 21
enforced by the people.
The degree of natural surveillance in an area affects the
offender's anticipated risk, and consequently, the desira-
bility of a given environment as a target for crime. Angel
suggests that crimes occur in areas which he deems "critical
intensity zones". The intensity of use of these areas is
sufficient to warrant the attention of offenders, while 'the
degree of natural surveillance is low and the risk of appre-
hension minimal. Areas which fall below the critical
intensity level do not supply enough potential victims to
attract offenders to the area. Areas which lie above the
critical intensity level benefit from a sufficient degree
of natural surveillance to deter crime. Exhibit 2 portrays
2 1Jacobs, J., "Sidewalk, Crime and Community," Liberation,
19:8-9 (Spring), 1976, pp. 56-60.
16
the hypothesized relationship. 2 2
Number
of
Crimes
Intensity of use of the areai
Number of people per unit of time
Exhibit 2
Crime Occurence in relationship
to intensity of use
The intensity of use of an environment and the degree
of security are mutually reinforcing variables. An area
perceived to be secure will be used more readily by pedes-
trians. As a result, the natural surveillance is increased,
the perceived risk to the offenders is amplified and thus,
the environment becomes more secure. Exhibit 3 illustrates
2 2 Angel, S., Discouraging Crime Through City Planning,
working paper no. 75, University of California: Berkeley,
1968, p. 16.
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the security and perception of security dynamic.2 3
Exhibit 3.
Security / Perception of Security Dynamic
The environmental design approach utilizes physical
planning and design to "symbolically" harden the environ-
ment through (a) land use allocation which generates street
activity thereby intensifying the degree of natural surveil-
lance, (b) architectural design measures which increase
the degree of surveillability from within the structure to
the exterior grounds, (c) well maintained physical environ-
2 3Conklin, J.F., CPTED in the Urban Shopping District,
Westinghouse Electric Corp., Washington, D.C., 1977.
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ments which portray an image of social control and law
enforcement, and (d) street design which reduces undesirable
vehicular and pedestrian traffic through the area. These
measures are designed to promote the sense of community
cohesion and responsibility for "communal turf" and to
impede the access of offenders by increasing their percep-
tion of the risk of detection and apprehension.2
4
The drawbacks of environmental design strategies are
(a) the high cost of construction, (b) the delays of con-
struction, (c) the dislocation of individuals andbusinesses,
or at least the significant alteration in their life
patterns, (d) the difficulty of rectifying physical altera-
tions if they prove to be ineffective or detrimental, and
(e) the long term nature of the strategies.
Nonetheless, environmental security planning projects
utilizing physical design improvements have met with suc-
cess in their efforts to improve security conditions.
Evaluatory studies of the Hartford Experiment, an environ-
mental security planning project in Hartford, Connecticut,
which incorporated physical design improvements, social
planning, and law enforcement measures, concluded that "en-
vironmental changes in a neighborhood can lead to an increase
in the extent to which residents control a neighborhood."
2 4Newman, 0., Defensible Space, Collier, New York, 1973.
19
Neighborhood residents perceived a reduction in crime and
expressed renewed confidence in the area.25
Furthermore, the appeal of mechanical and environmental
design approaches is the relative control of the planner
over the elements which contribute to the opportunities for
crime, which is not the case when dealing with personal
desires and motivations for crime. Target hardening tactics,
though they create the undesirable image of a fortified
environment as well as being costly, do provide readily
evident and relatively immediate effective results.
2 5 Center for Survey Research, Evaluation of a Neighborhood
Crime Control Experiment, North Asylum Hill, Hartford,
Connecticut. A Preliminary Study, Joint Center for Urban
Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard University, University of
Massachusetts, Boston, abstract, June 1980.
20
C. Conclusion
The various crime prevention measures contribute to
crime reduction in different ways: either by reducing the
motivations or the opportunities for crime. It is recog-
nized, however, that none of these approaches is "the"
solution for crime prevention as each area has its advan-
tages and drawbacks.
A disadvantage common to all the crime prevention
approaches mentioned is the major capital investment re-
quired. The criminal justice system alone expended a total
of 20 billion dollars in 1981, half of which was allocated
to law enforcement agencies. The decision to fund crime
prevention programs welfare economists argue, is ."determined
by whether the cost of the program is less than the benefit
as measured by the public willingness to pay."
2 6
An additional drawback is the possibility that the
employment of crime prevention measures in a given environ-
ment rather than prevent crime may simply cause various
forms of crime displacement: (a) temporal displacement --
a contribution of the same criminal pattern but at a dif-
ferent time, (b) tactical displacement -- a change in tac-
tics used in criminal activity, ususally precipitated by
some change in the accessibility of the target, (c) target
2 6Sedgewick, L.J., Deterring Criminals: Policy Making and
the American Tradition, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1980.
21
displacement -- a shift to another target occuring when the
original target appears relatively impervious to any crimi-
nal tactic, and (d) functional displacement -- a shift from
one crime type to another.27
For this reason, the National Swedish Council on Crime
Prevention advocates the necessity for synoptic planning.
Ever expanding crime prevention efforts
could probably deter the criminal who can
readily find legitimate ways to survive
in the face of the increasing difficulty
and risks of a criminal career. However,
criminals who perceive that they have no
survival alternative to criminality may
adopt ever more desperate and dangerous
methods for obtaining their criminal goals.
It is unlikely, therefore, that anything
short of an extensive and successful crime
prevention effort throughout the conmunity 28
will reduce crime.
2 7 CPTED Manual, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, vol. 3,
1977.
2 8 Knutson, J., et al., "Crime Prevention Activity of the
Police - A Theoretical Analysis," in Police and Social
Order, National Swedish Council for Crime Prevention,
1979.
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II. Environmental Security Planning: Crime Analysis and Imple-
mentation
A. Crime Analysis
Environmental security planning projects focus on the
reduction of crime in a spatially defined target area. The
project analysis may range from an entire city to adistrict,
a neighborhood, or acity block, depending upon the security
problem involved. The crime analysis of a security planning
problem attempts to determine what particular characteris-
tics contribute to the desirability of a given environment
as a target area.
The forms of data required for the analysis are:
(1) city crime rates over several years,
(2) local crime rates over several years, specifying loca-
tion and time of crime occurrence,
(3) victimization studies,
(4) known or suspected offender residency to detect offender
movement patterns in the target area,
(5) relevant neighborhood demographic characteristics, e.g.,
racial and ethnic characteristics, percentage of home-
ownership, rental and unoccupied units, percentage of
adolescents, welfare recipients and single parent fami-
lies, and unemployment levels in the neighborhood.
23
B. Crime Analysis Model
Criminologists depict the committing of a street crime
as a cost-benefit decision by an.individual who has both
the motivation and the opportunity to commit the crime. A
potential offender assesses the desirability of an opportu-
nity by weighing the anticipated payoff (monetary, release
of aggression) against the effort required to commit the
crime and the risk of apprehension involved.
Environments which are conducive to criminal behavior,
therefore, are those where a supply of targets withdesirable
payoffs can be anticipated, and where the effort required
to commit the crime and the risk of apprehension are low.
Effort may be a function of the ease of access to a target
due to a lack of target hardening measures, or of the jour-
ney to crime from the offender's home base to the target
area. Risk of apprehension is a function of the degree of
surveillance afforded by natural surveillance and/or
organized surveillance.
Thus the offender seeks targets (persons or property)
with anticipated payoff located in environments to which
the journey to crime is relatively effortless and where the
risk of apprehension via natural surveillance and/or
organized surveillance is low.
The conditions which contribute to an act of crime -are
summarized inthe following "crime analysismodel." (Exhibit 4)
24
Exhibit 4.
Crime Analysis Model
For the most part, the components of the model have
been discussed in the section on crime prevention approaches.
Those aspects of the model which have not been dealt with
previously will be developed here.
The Offender
The offender's perception of a given environment is
individual specific as attitudes are affected by personal
needs, values, goals, aspirations, and previous life experi-
ences. Thus, an environment which provides opportunities
for crime to one individual may be an undesirable target for
another.
The Journey to Crime
The journey to crime is measured by the distance of the
offender's home base to the target area. Criminologists
researching the spatial patterns of crime occurrence have
reported finding a distance-decay relationship in the journey
25
to crime -- the number of offenses declining with the in-
creasing distance from the residence of the offender.
"This distance-decay pattern results from the friction of
distance the cost in money, time, or energy of overcoming
distance."29 The journey to crime varies according to the
age group and the ethnicity of the offender and the type
of crime committed. The mean journey to crime for street
crime robberies, Br example, is 2.1 miles. Teenagers tend
to commit crimes in familiar areas close to home, while
maintaining sufficient distance to avoid recognition. 30
Targets/Payoffs
The presence or absence of targets in a given environ-
ment is a function of the land use which determines the
nature and the extent of activity in the area and in turn,
the degree of security afforded by the natural and organized
surveillance. Suttles,31 for example, speaks of "imper-
sonal domains" in large cities -- non-residential areas
which experience periodic 'anomie." In the daytime, these
environments are congested with local businessmen, employees,
customers, and police officers. At night, however, they be-
come deserted, and the lone individual, a target.
2 9 Philips, D.P., "The Journey to Crime," in Crime: A Spa-
tial Perspective, K.D. Harries et al. (eds.), Columbia
University, New York, 1980.
3 0Ibid.
31 Suttles, G.D., The Social Order of the Slum: Ethnicity and
Territory inthe InnerCity, University of Chicago Press, 1968.
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The degree of anticipated payoff is linked with the
land use of the area as well. Affluent environments gener-
ally provide desirable targets. The assessment of payoff
however, is individual specific,- as the payoff lucrative to
one offender may be trivial to another.
Where individuals are concerned, their desirability as
victims generally is a function of the street crime involved
and of the socio-demographic characteristics of the indivi-
dual such as sex, age, race, and income. For example, the
msot consistent finding in victimization surveys is that
males have higher rates of victimization than females for
almost all crime categories other than sexual assault.
Young people have higher rates of victimization for personal
crimes and thefts. However, in a few crime categories, such
as robbery with injury and larceny with contact, the elderly
have been found to have high or higher victimization rates
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than other age groups. 3
32 When race and sex are combined, black males have the high-
est victimization rates for violent crimes followed by
white males, black females, and white females. For per-
sonal crimes of violence, income and victimization rates
are inversely related. The incidence of violent crime is
highest among lower income families for both whites and
blacks (U.S., NCJITS, 1976). For personal crimes of theft,
victimization rates increase with family income. Thus,
members of families with incomes over $25,000 have the
highest rate of victimization for personal larceny, both
with contact purse snatching and pickpocketing and with-
out contact. Dodge, R., et al., "Crime in the United
States: A Report on the National Crime Survey," in Wesley
G. Skogan (ed.) Sample Surveys of the Victims of Crime,
Ballinger, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 1-26.
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The evidence of the potential victim's fear of crime
can also contribute to the perceived vulnerability of the
victim by the offender. Fear of.crime, however, appears to
be less related to substantial factors such as victimization
rates than it is to personal characteristics. 33 Women and
the elderly are fearful due to their self-image as vulnerable
targets.34
Natural/Organized Surveillance
The effectiveness of natural and organized surveillance
as crime deterrents has been discussed in the mechanical and
environmental design approaches to crime prevention. The
degree of natural surveillance in a given environment is a
function of the following design determinants: 3 5
(1) land use allocation which determines the nature and ex-
tent of activity in an area,
3 3 Fowler, Floyd, et al., Reducing Crime and Fear in an Urban
Residential Area. The Planning and Evaluation of an Inte-
grated Approach to Opportunity Reduction, Survey Research
Program, University of Massachusetts, 1978.
3 4 Stinchcombe, A.L., et al., Crime and Punishment in Public
Opinion: 1948-1974, National Opinion Research Center,
Chicago, Illinois, 1977.
3 5For detailed discussion of the use of physical design in
crime prevention planning, see Bell, L.S., et al., Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design Technical Guide 7,
Planning Public Outdoor Areas, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, 1978.
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(2) site planning of buildings and public amenities which
define the pedestrian and vehicular flows through the
area,
(3) architectural features of the buildings in the area
which determine the extent of visibility of the exterior
grounds from within the structures, e.g., windows., balco-
nies,
(4) landscaping, lighting and built form elements which
determine the degree of unobstructed view of the environ-
ment at ground level.
C. Planning and Implementation
The crime analysis required of an environmental security
planning project should be ongoing and not relegated merely
to the initial stages of the planning process. Two forms
of analysis are required: correlational analysis and experi-
mental analysis.
The initial crime-analysis is correlational -- one which
examines the degree of relationship among two or more vari-
ables as they naturally occur. Once security planning stra-
tegies are set in motion, experimental analyses are required
to investigate the effects of the deliberate actions taken
and to define future planning strategies accordingly. A
comprehensive crime data base is required to conduct the
various forms of analysis.
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Security planning strategies derived from the various
approaches to crime prevention (mechanical/environmental
design, corrective and punitive) are implemented to counter
the conditions determined by the crime-analysis as contri-
buting to the opportunities and motivation for crime. The
strategies emphasized, however, are those directed at the
opportunities for crime, for results are readily evident
within a relatively short time frame while strategies
directed at the motivations for criminal behavior are long
term.
The environmental security planning synoptic approach
to crime prevention is applied to the crime analysis model
in exhibit 5.
Exhibit 5.
Crime Analysis Model /
Environmental Security Planning Strategies
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SECTION B
The Longwood Medical Area
"Why is there so much
crime here? Because
we're an easy mark,
that's why."
Harvard Medical
School Administrator
31
I. Crime Analysis
35
A. Neighborhood Context 35
The Longwood Medical
Area (otherwise referred
to as the Harvard Medical
Centre) is located in
the neighborhood of eaith
Roxbury, approximately
two and one half miles
from the central busi-
ness district of
Boston (exhibit 6).
The 154 acre area is
composed of fourteen
medical institutions,
five colleges, three Exhibit 6.City Context
public schools, a temple, limited housing and local retail
shops (exhibit 7).
The area is demarcated by natural and man-made borders.
The Muddy River and Fenway Parkland form the Northern border
of the LMA, with Brookline, an affluent and stable community
3 5 Given the scope of this thesis, the analysis of the neigh-
borhood surroundings is qualitative rather than a thorough
statistical documentation, as recommended on.p. 22.
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Medical Institutions
1. Beth Israel (BI)
2. Brigham a Women (B&W)
3. Children's Hospital
Medical Centre (CHMC)
4. Joslin Diabetes
Foundation
5. Judge Baker Guidance
Center
6. Massachusetts Mental
Hospital
7. New England Deaconess
Hospital (NEDH)
8. Sidney Farber Cancer
Institute
Educational Institutions
9. Boston Latin High School
10. Emmanuel College
11. English High School
12. Harvard Medical School
13. Harvard School of Dental
Medicine
14. Harvard School of Public
Health
15. Mass. College of Art
16. Mass. College of Pharmacy
17. Sinuons College
18. Winsor School
19. Wheelock College
Other
20. Gardiner Museum
21. Temple
22. Retail
Exhibit 7.
The Longwood Medical Area
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to the northwest, and the Fenway, a low income community to
the northeast. To the south, Huntington Avenue separates
the LMA from the communites of Mission Hill and the neigh-
borhoods of Roxbury, communities which contain the highest
concentration of low income and minority groups in the
region. Tensions between the medical area and the surroun-
36
ding communities run high. Community opposition to in-
stitutional expansion led to the signing of an agreement
between the LMA and the :southwestern communities in 1977,
stipulating community consent to any future institutional
development beyond Huntington Avenue. A more recent bone
of contention has been the Medical Area Total Energy Plant
(MATEP) constructed by Harvard University within the LMA.
The communities, fearing heightened pollution levels,
furiously opposed the construction and operation of the
plant for over ten years. "This is guerilla warfare,"
exclaimed one board member of the Mission Hill Planning
Commission. Harvard, however, has emerged the victor.37
36 For a more detailed account of the Longwood Medical Area/
community conflict, see William Worthy's The Rape of Our
Neighborhoods.
3 7 Bethell, J.T., "How Does It Feel to Have a 73-Megawatt
Headache?" Harvard Magazine, July-August 1980.
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B. Street Crime in the LMA
1. Data Base
The data pertaining to street crime in the LMA is based
primarily upon interviews with the MASCO member institutions'
security directors and administrators. There is adeficiency
of readily available statistical data regarding crime rates
and crime trends in the LMA. Although Boston police records
are obtainable, these have not been collected by the LMA
institutions as of yet. The security directors, skeptical
of the usefulness of city police reporting prefer to rely
upon their own data base. Unfortunately, the primary
source of LMA compiled crime reports, the Longwood Medical
Area Committee on Security monthly reports, provide only a
general review of the crime occurrences at the various
institutions (specifying category of crime but not location)
and thus are not of great use for the purposes of this
thesis. The two sources which have been referred to are the
MASCO External Patrol Reports, and the Harvard University
Police Department reports. These reports, which date back
to September 1980, provide a detailed account of street
crimes in the LMA -- time, location, and crime type.
2. Street Crimes in the LMA
La) Categories
Street crimes in the medical area are typically
(i) crimes against persons -- assaults, rapes, robberies,
35
and purse snatchings; and, (ii) crimes against property --
auto thefts and larceny. Armed robberies have been a fre-
quent occurrence of the last few years.
(b) Time
Approximately 60% of the crimes occur at night.
(c) Location
The majority of crimes within the LMA occur in areas
adjacent to the southern border. These zones typically are
darkened parking lots (e.g., Harvard Medical School Parking
lot, Beth Israel parking lot) and side streets (e.g., Palace
Road, Pilgrim Road). The majority of violent crimes, how-
ever, occur in the peripheral areas of the LMA -- Huntington
Avenue, Fenwood Road, the Riverway, the Fenway. Avenue
Louis Pasteur, though bordered by six institutions, is a
"no man's land" zone and therefore is regarded qualitatively
as a "peripheral" area.
Most of the personal assaults reported by the Harvard
University Police Department occur off the campus grounds,
across Huntington Avenue (e.g., St. Alphonsus Street,
Wigglesworth Road) (exhibit 8).38
3 8The map in exhibit 8 is a representation of the spatial
distribution of crime intensity and not a full account
of the number of offenses which occurred in the LMA during
the period of January-September 1981. Statistics gathered
by the Longwood Medical Area Committee on Security indicate
that approximately twice as many offenses were committed
during that period. Statistical distribution of crimes
in the peripheral areas are not provided, though these
zones are highlighted on the map.
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Exhibit 8.
Crimes in the LMA. January - September,1981.
Source: MASCO External Patrol Reports
Harvard University Police Department Reports
Legend:
0 street crime
M= MIMMMM!= R4;= 2 I-- - - - ----
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3. Crime Rates
(a) Neighborhood Context
The LMA is located in District 2, the Roxbury-Dorches-
ter-Mattapan precinct of the Boston Police Department. Dis-
trict 2 is reported to have the highest crime rate in New
England.3 9
(b) The LMA
Due to the lack of available statistical data, it is
difficult to determine the severity of crime in the LMA
independant of and in comparison to other neighborhoods of
metropolitan Boston. The assessment of the severity of the
crime problem in the Longwood Medical Area is based upon
the individual perceptions of the security directors and
administrators. This perception varies from institution to
institution. There is a direct correlation between the
degree to which an institution suffers from street crime
and the perception of the severity of the problem. Thus,
administrators of the Harvard Medical School, which is
located along the southern border of the LMA, maintain that
their security problem "is an urgent one." On the other
hand, the security personnel of the Massachusetts College of
39 Welch, J.O., "Mission Hill Project No. 1 for New England
Crime," Boston Herald, October 27, 1981.
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Art, situated on the corner of Longwood and Brookline
Avenues and closer to the northeastern border, do not con-
sider the security problem to be.significant. "The security
problem is minimal compared to other parts of the city."
Hubert D. Sycamore, NEDH. assistant director andprevious
chairman of the Longwood Medical Area Committee on Security,
contends that "there is a direct correlation between the
extent of effort, thinking and management an institution
invests in the problem solving of the security problem and
the perception of the severity of the problem".
39
C. Application of the Crime Analysis Model to the Longwood
Medical Area
1. Offenders
There are some commonly held perceptions in the LMA as
to who the offenders are and where they come from.4 0
Ka) The majority of street crime offenders are teenagers
(13-18 years old) and young adults (18-25 years old).
They are of both white and black ethnicity.
(b) It is estimated that 50-70% of the offenders emanate
from the immediate area, with the remainder travelling
from other parts of the city.
(c) The local sources of offenders most commonly singled
out are the Mission Hill Housing Projects located across
Huntington Avenue from the LMA, and English High School
situated on Avenue Louis Pasteur in the center of the medi-
cal area (see exhibit 7, p. 32 )-
The security directors recognize that the offenders
seemingly emanating from the projects may in fact be youths
4 0Crime data has not been gathered to substantiate these per-
ceptions of the security directors and the administrators
of the institutions.
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residing in other parts of the city who use the public
housing area as a haven for refuge. State Representative
Kevin Fitzgerald of Mission Hill asserts that the projects,
... are used as a jump-off point. These
punks, who come from other neighborhoods
.too, make a hit on St._Alphonsus Street
(the continuation of Longwood Avenue,
across Huntington Avenue) and run back
in. I grew up in Mission Hill project.
It's a maze. Anyone would think twice 41
before chasing someone into it.
The maze-like quality of the projects coupled with its
reputation as "assassination row" deters the pursuit of
offenders by the security forces of the LMA and thus enhances
the desirability of the projects as a haven for refuge.
Joe Barton, Neighborhood Development Agency planner
for Mission Hill and the Medical Area maintains that the
percentage of resident offenders in the projects is low.
The offenders who do live in the projects, however, are a
serious security threat to the project residents and the
surrounding communities.
Similarly, a portion of the offenses attributed to the
students of English High School may in fact be the actions
of youths of high-school age from other parts of the city
posing as students of English High.
4 1 Welch, J.0., "Mission Hill Project No. 1 for New England
Crime," Boston Herald, October 27, 1981.
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2. Journey to Crime
(a) Neighborhood Context
If the perception that the majority of offenders in the
LMA emanate from the local communities is correct, then the
journey to crime theory would be a major factor in the de-
sirability of the medical area as a target.
(b) The LMA
The journey to crime theory is consistent with the
spatial distribution of crime patterns within the LMA itself.
Crime rates are highest in the zones near the perceived
sources of offenders -- the high school, the southern edge
of the LMA -- those areas which require the least effort in
the journey to crime.42 For example, the New England
Deaconess Hospital attributes its relatively secure situ-
ation to its distance from the sources of offenders. Brook-
4 2 The journey to crime of the high school students is mea-
sured from their "homebase" in the area -- the high school
-- as opposing to their residences in other parts of the
city.
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line Avenue which separates NEDH from the rest of the medi-
cal area serves as a "Berlin Wall" -- a physical and psycho-
logical obstacle to potential offenders.
The journey to
crime is facilitated
by the ease of access
to private and semi-
private zones in the ' *
medical area, designed
to facilitate inter-
institutional exchange
of staff, patients and CHMC
equipment. For example -
the rear gate of Beth --
Israel Hospital is
left open to facili-
tate the BI-CHMC-B&W BI
inter-institutional
flow along Blackfan
Street. This allows
for easy infiltration
of English High School
students (exhibit 9) .
Exhibit 9.
BI - CTIC - B&W
inter-institutional flow
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3. Targets
There are two primary street crime targets in the LMA:
persons and property (automobiles). Activity characteris-
tics and land use conditions contribute to the victimization
of members of the medical community in the following ways:
(a) Medical community persons are desirable targets as the
anticipated payoff to be gained from the mugging of a
doctor, nurse, or visitor is relatively high. Money,
perhaps pharmaceuticals, may be acquired. For example,
the murder of Dr. Wood, a resident surgeon at the Colum-
bia-Presbyterian Hospital, New York City, evoked the
following response from neighborhood youths: "It's
wrong they killed the guy, but you know, doctors have
money.1"43
(b) The 24 hour activity at medical institutions necessitate
routine shifts of staff throughout the day and night --
usually at 3 p.m., 11 p.m., and 7 a.m. The streets of
3 Basler, B. , "Surgeon's Slaying Stuns Upper West Side,"
New York Times, November 4, 1981, p Bl.
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the LMA are relatively deserted from the evening hours
through the early hours of the morning rendering the
individuals coming to and from the premises vulnerable
targets.
(c) Neighborhood Context. Three of the major transportation
depots are located on the outskirts of the medical area
grounds and do not benefit from the natural and organized
surveillance afforded by the LMA.44 The institutions
offer escort services to points of departure (public or
private transportation) and patrol the various subway
and bus stops (Huntington/Longwood Avenue, Brigham
Circle, the Longwood T stop) (see exhibit 10). The
escort services, however, do not assist those persons
arriving to the medical area nor do the security guards
remain with the escorted individuals at the point of
departure. The person awaiting the arrival at the Long-
wood T stop (which is located in a gully) or at the
Longwood/Huntington Avenue subway station (adjacent to
the Mission Hill housing projects) is not spared the
risk of victimization and certainly not the fear of
assault. The same problem holds true forpersons parked
44
Many institutions station guards at key outdoor locations
during nighttime shifts (e.g.,.garage areas, peripheral
zones.
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on side streets both within the LMA and outside of it
(e.g., Pilgrim Road and Palace Road on the LMA, Wiggles-
worth Street and St. Alphonsus Road outside the LMA).
These streets are generally poorly lit, suffer from a
lack of natural and organized surveillance and are the
scene of the majority of car thefts, larceny, and as-
saults upon car owners. On-street parking is a neces-
sity for those who cannot find space in the overcrowded
parking facilities of the LMA or for those who do not
wish to pay the monthly charge. 4 5
(d) The particular disposition of persons involved with
health care concerns may enhance their vulnerability as
desirable targets. Patients and visitors preoccupied
with concerns of illness and matters of life and death,
may not adopt the crime prevention measures necessary
to protect themselves. "The last thing a mother of a
sick child is going to think about is whether she's
locked her car door, or is holding onto her bag tightly
enough." 46
4 5 MASCO is attempting to remedy the parking problem by or-
ganizing car pools, and providing off-site parking facili-
ties with shuttle bussing to the LMA.
4 6 Kristien Vineburg, Director of Security, Brigham and
Women's Hospital.
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According to one security director, nurses are particu-
larly trusting people, who don't have their guard up.47
Doctors and nurses, according to another, are so pre-
occupied with their work that they are unaware of the
goings on around them. For this reason, he maintains,
the environment should be the design equivalent of a
"foolproof nursery" which protects the staff despite
their own lack of awareness and caution. 48
4 7 Jim Daniels, Security Director, Children's Hospital Medi-
cal Center.
4 8 Kristien Vineburg, Security Director, Brigham and Women's
Hospital.
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4. Natural Surveillance
The varying degrees of natural surveillance throughout
the medical area are determined by the following conditions.
(a) Land use activity. Scheduling of activity hours in the
medical area varies from institution to institution.
The medical institutions operate twenty-four hours a
day; the universities end classes in the early evenings
but the libraries remain open till approximately eleven
o'clock; the public schools terminate classes at approxi-
mately 3 p.m. Commercial activities in the LMA, apart
from two twenty-four hour facilities, close between 6
and 8 p.m. The result is an uneven spatial and temporal
distribution of activity. For example, Pilgrim Road and
Avenue Louis Pasteur, the respective locations of Winsor
School and English High, become relatively deserted in
the late hours of the afternoon. As a result, street
crime on these streets is prevalent. The institutions
have responded by warning the medical community to avoid
48
these areas when walking without an escort. In order to
safeguard its students, Massachusetts College of Phar-
macy has curtailed its evening activities. This defen-
sive response of avoidance has augmented the lack of
natural surveillance in these areas, thus increasing
the security danger.
There are, however, examples of land use activities
in the LMA which as a result of the natural surveillance
they afford, increase the security in the areas around
them. For example, a twenty-four hour street vendor
recently installed on the corner of Shattuck and Black-
fan Streets generates a flow of patrons throughout the
night and provides a deterrent on this otherwise deserted
street. NEDH security director John Connelly maintains
that this has resulted in a marked security improvement.
(b) Site Planning. Pedestrian flows in the LMA are largely
determined by the interrelationship between primary
building entries, public and private transportation
depots and other services.
The entries to the majority of the institutions lie
along the Longwood and Brookline Avenue axis. These
arteries benefit from maximum pedestrian and vehicular
flow resulting in natural surveillance (exhibits 10 & 11).
In instances where buildings have not been sited
to maximize pedestrian flow cohesiveness and clustering,
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Exhibit 10.
Pedestrian Flows through the IA
Exhibit 11.
Vehicular Flows through the LMA
Iaaend:
m primary
' secndary
A building entry
S paiung garae
parking lot
bus / subway stop
Iaaerd:
m primary
" secondar
A building entry
* paring garage
* parking ot
bus / subway stop
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the benefits of natural surveillance have been diffused.
For example, the newly constructed Brigham and Women's
Hospital faces Francis Street turning its back to the
activity generated along Longwood Avenue and the inter-
institutional flow along Blackfan Street.
(c) Architectural features. The ability to survey the
street from within the institutions coupled with the
level of internal activity enhances the natural surveil-
lance of the exterior grounds. The absence of natural
surveillance intensifies the fear of crime and the risk
of victimization. For example, parking lots are typical-
ly poorly surveilled areas. The parking lot to the rear
of the Massachusetts College of Art, however, benefits
not only from the general surveillance of its surroun-
dings (located on the corner of Longwood and Brookline
Avenues and within close proximity of the Children's
Inn on Longwood Avenue, a hotel maintained by Children's
Hospital Medical Center), but also from the surveillance
provided by the presence of the glass blowing facility
located at this end of the building. According to the
security personnel, the twenty-four hour activity on
this facility affords the parking lot with additional
natural surveillance and increases the security of the
area.
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Many of the institutions are built in the mode of
the "urban fortress" prototype. Surrounded by gates and
walls, protecting inner courtyards with few points of
entry, the complexes are self-contained and do not lend
themselves to interaction with the street.49 For exam-
ple, the Harvard Medical School buildings form a wall
which runs the length of Huntington Avenue (between
Francis Street and Longwood Avenue). There is one point
of public entry, ususally monitered; one entire facade
of the School of Public Health facing Huntington Avenue
is windowless; Countway Library is set back from the
street safeguarded by a "moat" (in which there is no
water) and is further protected by landscaping and metal
gating.
This architectural form of institutional self-
protection results in a lack of interaction withHunting-
ton Avenue and generates pedestrian fear along this
unsurveilled edge of the campus.
49
For security reasons, most institutions prefer to lock the
majority of the facility entries. For example, NEDH, in
the last ten years, has reduced the number of functioning
entries from 30 to 10, with only 2 remaining open at night.
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(d) Unobstructed view of exterior grounds:
Built Form elements and landscaping provide hiding
opportunities for offenders by creating "blind spots."
Example (1): The wooden
fence encompassing the
property of Winsor
School prevents poten-
tial victims from de- blind
spot
tecting offenders
lurking around the
corner (exhibit 12).
Exhibit 12.
Example (2): Two Winsor School Fence
students were assaulted by an offender hidden behind an
evergreen tree on the heavily landscaped Emmanuel Campus.
Emerging from his hiding spot, he relieved the women of
several thousands of dollars worth of jewelry.
Lighting. Lighting levels are poor throughout the
majority of the LMA, apart from the major arteries.
Overgrown trees along Avenue Louis Pasteur block the
light of this otherwise well lit street.50
The compilation of these various conditions results in
the following naturally surveilled and unsurveilled terri-
tories (exhibit 13).
50
MASCO, recognizing the problem of deficient lighting, has
recently conducted an LMA lighting survey.
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Exhibit 13.
Natural Surveillance in the LMA.
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In contrast to the usual benefits of natural surveil-
lance, there are certain conditions in which certain street
activity can promote opportunities for crime.
(1) Purse snatching and pickpocketing are common in areas
such as bus stops and street vendor lines where the
crowding and congestion distract the victims from the
commission of offenses and afford the offender the ability
to escape into a crowd undetected.
(2) Public amenities legitimize the presence of offenders.
Thus, retail facilities, bus stops and the like provide
offenders with an alibi to loiter in the area without
raising suspicion. This phenomenon has evoked one secu-
rity planning theory that commercial activities should
not be used as a security device -- for they will merely
invite offenders to the area.51 This is contrary, of
course, to the premise of natural surveillance which
attempts to increase the multi-use nature and activity
level of an area.
(3) Unenclosed properties, while affording maximum natural
surveillance simultaneously provide escape routeopportu-
nities for offenders. For example, the escape route from
5 1Private Security Advisory Council, Potential Secondary Im-
pacts of the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
Concept, Law Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department
of Justice, 1976.
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Avenue Louis Pasteur to the housing projects is unob-
structed due to the porosity of the gating encompassing
Boston Latin High School (situated on Avenue Louis
Pasteur across from English High School).
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5. Organized Surveillance
Organized surveillance is the major form of crime pre-
vention in the LMA. Although local and state patrols are
heavily supplemented by private institutional security
systems, organized surveillance in the LMA is weak and as
a result, the medical area remains an easy mark.
(a) Neighborhood Context
(1) The Police Forces. The Longwood Medical Area is-located
at the juncture of properties which fall under the jurisdic-
tion of different municipal governments and state agencies
and their respective police forces. The Fenway parkland is
property of the Metropolitan District Commission; the LMA,
the Fenway and the southwestern communities are located in
Boston; to the northwest lies the City of Brookline. The
security patrol of the juncture points near the LMA are
weak as each police department defers to the other's turf,
and attention is focused on central areas rather than peri-
pheral zones.
(2) Institutional Private Security Forces. The patrol of
the institutional security forces is limited to the area
57
defined by the boundaries of the LMA. The institutions have
cautioned the medical community to refrain from crossing the
Huntington Avenue border. This policy of avoidance, how-
ever, does not assist those persons' living in neighborhoods
to the south of the LMA nor those requiring public trans-
portation on Huntington Avenue (see Targets (c), p. 44 ).52
(b) The LMA
(1) The Police Forces. According to the institutions'
security directors, the activities of the Boston City Police
in the LMA are limited. The reasons cited are: (i) the
already overburdened police system faced with recent budget
53
cutbacks; (ii) the fact that the LMA is at a municipal-
political disadvantage since it neither contributes to the
city tax base (the institutions are non-profit) nor does it
generate votes (a large portion of the medical staff lives
outside of Boston); (iii) crime rates in the LMA are not as
5 2Marie Cone, a medical clerk at the LMA and a resident of
the Back Bay Manor on St. Alphonsus Street across form the
medical area, reports: "I've lived here for 11 years.
Only in the last year has it gotten too bad to live here.
I don't know if I will continue to go to work." "Mission
Hill Project No. 1 for Crime," Boston Herald, October 27,
1981.
5 3 Powers, John, "The Boston Police White Budget, Proposition
2 1/2 are Nibbling Away at Morale," Boston Sunday Globe,
July 26, 1981, p. A23.
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severe as other areas and the Boston police are relying on
the local private security forces to handle the situation.
Another complaint of the LMA security directors against
the city police is the long response time, an average delay
of 35 to 40 minutes. The, retail storeowners in the area
maintain that this lack of servicing is not due to the bud-
get cutbacks as the response time of the city police has
always been a problem. The storeowners release apprehended
shoplifters since "there is no point waiting if the police
won't show up in-areasonable amount of time."
(2) Institutional Private Security Forces. The ability of
the security guards to deter crime in the LMA is hampered by
inadequate training and a lack of inter-institutional coor-
dination.
(i) Contract Services versus In-House Security Groups.
The institutions utilize the services of a contract security
group. Though advantageous economically, the employment of
these guards (versus the maintenance of an in-house group)
poses some serious drawbacks. Contract security guards are
generally poorly trained, and of a low caliber. Their com-
mitment to a poorly rewarded position is low and the turnover
rate is extremely high. The security guards are respected
neither by the staff nor by the offenders, and therefore,
their effectiveness as a deterrent is severely impaired.
For example, the pros and cons of contract servicing versus
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in-house security forces can be demonstrated through the
experience of CHMC which, during the years 1975-1977
maintained an in-house security force.54 The in-house
group was disbanded as the result of a budget overrun, and
replaced by a contract security group in 1978. Ths costs of
operation were reduced by 50%. On the other hand, training
of in-house police officers which had averaged 80 hours of
orientation plus an additional 208 hours per year per offi-
cer dropped to 16 hours of orientation with an additional
5 hours per year per officer. Job turnover increased from
7.5% per year to 400% per year. Crime rates more than
doubled between the years of 1978 to 1980 (exhibit 14) 55
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Exhibit 14.
Criminal Incidents Reported to Security:
1975 - 1980
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The CHMC-MASCO in-house police force served CHMC, Boston
Hospital for Women (Lying in and Parking division), Judge
Baker Guidance Center Health Incorporated, CHMC resi-
dential properties merged by Meredith and Grew, Mission
Park and MASCO property.
5 5 Connelly, J.T., and S.E. Cain, An Analysis of The Child-
ren's Hospital Medical Center' s Security Program, Hospi-
tal Security Deparment, Children's Hospital MedicalCenter,
Boston, 1980.
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The majority of security directors prefer a combination
of an in-house security force and a contract security group.
Harvard University's police department is structured along
these lines, the only security department which differs in
its organization from the rest of the institutions. The
Harvard University Police Department (HUPD) maintains an
in-house security force composed of officers deputized in
the counties of Suffolk and Middlesex, supplemented by a
contract security group.56 The officers engage in law
enforcement activities (apprehension and arrests) while the
security guards provide a more massive crime prevention
presence deterrent.
(ii) Weapons. Apart from the Harvard University police
officers, the medical area security guards do not carry arms.
The administrators are reluctant to arm their guards for
fear of turning the LMA into an "armed camp." Armed rob-
beries however, are a growing occurrence in the medical area
and the security directors fear for the safety of both their
personnel and the general community. "They're (the institu-
tions) just going through the motions," complained one secu-
rity director, "They say they want security but they're not
56
The HUPD in the medical area are further backed by the
HUPD in Cambridge, A Boston policeman has been retained to
guard the medical school dormitory, Vanderbilt Hall,
which is adjacent to English High School on Avenue Louis
Pasteur.
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willing to pay for it. A secretary is given a thousand
dollar word processor and an underpaid security guard a
flashlight." A MASCO administrator further criticized the
no-arms policy. "It's going to take a major disaster before
they (the institutions) turn around and properly train and
arm these guys. A murder. Perhaps several rapes." For
example, the murder of a medical student at John Hopkins
Medical Institute 3 years ago was the impetus for a total
restructuring of the JHMI security department. Salaries
were raised to attract a higher caliber security guard, the
forces were arned and deliberate policies to employ minori-
ties and residents of the community were formulated.5 7
(iii) The lack of inter-institutional coordination in
external patrols results in inefficient use of manpower and
resources. For example, shared borderline properties patrol-
led by neighboring institutions experience cycles of securi-
ty-overload -- periods when two or more security forces may
patrol an area at the same time -- followed by periods of
desertion.
The institutions call upon one another for assistance
in law enforcement activities. However, the absence of a
central dispatch system severely impairs their ability to
57
See appendix, pp. 90-91.
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apprehend offenders-in hot pursuit.5 8
(iv) The lack of inter-institutional security planning
results in the displacement of crime in the LMA rather than
the prevention of crime. For example, the stationing of a
Boston policeman to guard the Harvard Medical School dormi-
tory on Avenue Louis Pasteur, displaced the security diffi-
culties it faced to the adjacent property of CHMC. Following
suit, CHMC heightened their security patrol, thereby further
displacing the offenders down Longwood Avenue to Christie's
Market (territorial and tactical displacement).
(v) The MASCO external patrol, formed by the Longwood
Medical Area Committee on Security is composed of two vans
which circulate the LMA between the hours of 4 p.m. and 7
a.m. Though the patrol is recognized as an effective crime
prevention unit, the degree of its deterence ability is
hampered by the small scale of operation.59
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The central dispatch currently in use comunicates to the
various institutional central dispatch systems. The sys-
tem discussed above is one which can call upon the various
security forces directly.
5 9 The lack of available statistical data precludes the pos-
sibility of conducting an experimental analysis regarding
the patrol's effectiveness.
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D. Security Planning in the LMA: Management
1. Institutional Security Planning
(a) The LMA institutions primarily plan for their security
needs independantly of one another. Security strategies
focus on organized surveillance, patrol and escort, with
limited attempts at providing crime prevention education
seminars to the medical staff. In total, the MASCO member
institutions expend approximately $4 1/2 million per annum.
The large proportion, approximately 70%, of security expen-
ditures focus oninternal security.
(b) The support of security planning strategies is weighed
against other fiscal, political, administrative, functional,
and convenience considerations. The security directors cite
examples of proposed recommended security strategies which
were disqualified due to those considerations.
Example (1): The CHMC emergency ward is used by the
staff during the winter months as a waiting area for the
bus which stops at the corner of Longwood Avenue and Black-
fan Streets. This convenience, however, is equally appealing
to the high school students, some of whom create disturbances
and occasional security problems once they are within the
waiting area. In the summer, the bus stop is a prime loca-
tion for pickpocketing due to the congestion created by the
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flow to and from the emergency ward. The request that the
bus depot be moved down the block was refused by the admi-
nistrators who were unwilling to inconvenience their staff.
Example (2): The Beth Israel parking gate is left
ajar to facilitate the BI-CHMC-B&W inter-institutional flow
along Blackfan Street (see exhibit 9 ). An alternative to
closing the gate is to install an alarmed gate along the
edge of English High School, thereby impeding the ease of
access to the property. BI and CHMC, the hospitals most
affected by this adjacency, have chosen not to invest in
this strategy, the cost of which would amount to approxi-
mately twenty to thirty thousand dollars.
(c) Security planning often assumes the form of "crisis
planning." In reaction to a specific event, extreme pre-
cautionary measures are rapidly initiated. As there is
little time to test their functional compatibility with the
other requirements of servicing in the institutions, the
measures are often relaxed or abandoned as the sense of
urgency subsides.
(d) There is a lack of joint-professional consultation in
the planning and development of the LMA. This, inevitably,
affects the security of the area. Security directors, for
example, were not consulted prior to the recent construction
of the Brigham and Women's Hospital. The siting of the -
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B&W entry way towards Francis Avenue facing away from the
activity generated on Longwood Avenue and Blackfan Street
and the failure to install a rear exit security system have
resulted in a diffusion of pedestrian circulation along the
Blackfan Street axis and thus in a weakened external
security system, and in the unnecessary expenditures contin-
gent on installing the system after construction.
2. Joint Institutional Security Planning
(a) Joint institutional security planning consists of the
Longwood Medical AreaCommittee on Security, composed of
MASCOmemberinstitution security directors, who convene on
a monthly basis to share information and security experi-
ences. The primary complaint against the committee is that
it is not action oriented. The MASCO external patrol which
was created by the committee is the exception to the rule.
MASCO's most recent attempt at joint-institutional planning
occurred during the course of the master programming process.
An ad hoc security committee composed of selected members of
the Longwood Medical Area Committee on Security and several
MASCO administrators was formed, Recommendations of the ad
hoc security committee for future security planning efforts
on the LMA included joint-institutional patrols, crime data
collection and improved lighting conditions. Results of
these recommendations are not yet apparent.
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(b) Joint institutional security planning is hampered by the
reluctance of the institutions to relinquish any part of
their individual autonomy and authority. This unfortunately
is typical of most of the joint-institutional planning
efforts and not merely in the area of security planning.
For example, it is generally recognized that a merger of
patrol forces would enhance the external security within
the LMA. However, the institutions concern for their auto-
nomy and their unwillingness to expend the sums which such
a venture would require have hindered such cooperation.60
(c) Though all the institutions agree that security is an
issue of concern, the perception as to the severity of the
problem is not uniform. This results in a variance in the
willingness to expend additional funds for joint security
planning efforts.
(d) One of the motivations for enhancing the security of
the LMA and the public's perception of the area's safety,
is to maintain the LMA as a desirable environment to work
and visit. In the course of the master programming process,
the administrators voiced the concern that if the traffic
6 0 The MASCO-CHMC-BLI in-house security force expenditures
were approximately $1.4 million per annum. See footnote
54.
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and security problems increased, the institutions would
invariably "drive the doctors to the suburbs." At this
time, the security problem is not so acute as to outweigh
the prestige imparted to medical.staff working at the Har-
vard Medical School and affiliated hospitals. To clerical
staff and nurses, however, this may not be sufficient in-
ducement and it is they who could pose the immediate person-
nel difficulties if security conditions were to worsen.
Meanwhile, however, the equilibrium between a poor security
image and the operation of the hospitals is being maintained
and therefore, there is no great incentive to invest in
security at this time by the administrators who lean towards
"crisis planning."
(e) Neighborhood Context: Joint institutional-community
efforts. The administrations of the LMA institutions hold
varying attitudes towards the neighborhoods in which they
are lodged and for whom the security problem is at least as
serious if not more severe than that experienced within the
LMA itself,
(i) MASCO administrators have contemplated joint insti-
tutional-community security efforts as a means for relieving
the conflicts between the institutions and the community.
The mistrust of the community, the responsibility to be
undertaken and the capital investment which might be re-
quired in joint institutional-community planning
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discourage the development of such planning endeavors.
(ii) Joint institutional-community security planning
efforts are constrained by the political tensions between
the institutions and the communities which pervade all
attempts at institutional-community planning and not merely
that of security planning. There is minimal dialogue be-
tween MASCO and the communities. Huntington Avenue serves
as the medial area's "Berlin Wall" separating it from the
problems of the communities next door. There appears to be
a relatively vague understanding on the part of the LMA
institutions as to the needs and predicament of their neigh-
bors. This is not unique to the LMA. A survey of univer-
sities across the country examining university-community
tension and urban campus form found that tensions between
the neighborhood and the university were lowest in communi-
ties where the percentage of poor and/or black families
resided. The perceptions of the university administrators,
however, were just the opposite. It was their belief that
the higher the percentage of poor and/or black families in
the neighborhood, the.greater the tensions and the conflicts.
The authors of the research project conclude that,
this may well be the most remarkable
findings of the research. It should
cause university administrators and
planners to change some of their con- 61
ceptions.
6 1 Carroll, R.L. et al., University-Community Tension and Ur-
ban -Campus Form, Depts. of Sociology andCommunity Planning,
University of Cincinnati, 1972, p. 11.
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(iii) The attitudes towards the offenders perceived as
residing in the neighboring communites varies. One common
opinion as expressed by one security director is: "There
is nothing you can do about the national, social-economic
problems. The only thing you can do is put up the barbed
wire fence and bring out the dogs to protect yourself."
Though such extremes have not been taken, security planning
strategies in the LMA focus on the urban fortress mode of
operation. Harvard Medical School administrators have
expressed the desire to upgrade the neighborhood in the
attempt to improve the LMA security and image. The form
that such an "upgrading" would adopt is not clear.
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E. Crime Analysis Sumrary
Street crimes in the Longwood Medical Area are preva-
lent in areas classified as critical intensity zones --
areas where targets are available and the risk of apprehen-
sion via natural and/or organized surveillance is low.
Furthermore, the distribution of crimes correlates with the
journey to crime theory -- areas which are closest to the
perceived sources of offenders and require the least effort
in the journey to crime suffer from high crime rates.
The security planning strategies in the LMA are limited
in that they focus on organized surveillance tactics rather
than utilizing strategies from the entire spectrum of the
crime analysis model. Furthermore, they are confined to the
boundaries of the medical area as opposed to considering the
LMA in the context of its surrounding neighborhoods. The
lack of coordinated security efforts among the LMA institu-
tions and between the institutions and the surrounding
communities result in (a) the displacement rather than the
prevention of crime within the LMA, and (b) the perpetuation
of deteriorated physical and security conditions of the
neighboring communities which provide a haven for resident
offenders and offenders from other parts of the city, The
proximity to these neighborhoods increases the imminent security
danger to the medical area as well as substantiating the LMA's
undesirable reputation of being located in a bad neighborhood.
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II. Environmental Security Planning in the Longwood
Medical Area: Recommendations
The following list of environmental security planning
strategies provides a conceptual framework for future secu-
rity planning in the Longwood Medical Area. The crime analy-
sis model applied to the LMA case study forms the backbone
of the security planning process proposed. Once hypothe-
sized theories of crime patterns and their causes are tested
and determined (correlational analysis), appropriate security
planning strategies can be directed to circumvent the condi-
tions which contribute to the opportunities and motivations
for crime. As stressed throughout the study, the security
problems of the LMA are to be examined and prescribed for
in the context of its surroundings. For this reason, the
strategies suggested are divided into two categories:
(a) within the LMA, and (b) outside the LMA. The strategies
are directed at each of the crime analysis components:
targets, offenders, journey to crime, natural surveillance,
and organized surveillance.
It is recommended that a sequence of short, intermedi-
ate, and long term strategies derived from the various crime
prevention approaches (mechanical/environmental design,
punitive and corrective) be applied accordingly. Organized
surveillance measures are effective short term strategies
which placate the severity of the security problem in a
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given area while setting the stage for the results of inter-
mediate and long term strategies, The objective is to
create an environment where law enforcement is self-imposed
through natural surveillance and organized surveillance is
merely a supplementary crime prevention device. Strategies
aimed at reducing offender motivation, although they form
an integral part of the synoptic planning effort, are not
emphasized because of the complexity of the many factors
involved, the uncertainty of positive results and the long
term nature of the expected benefits.
All the security planning strategies do not necessarily
entail additional outlays of capital. The intent of an
environmental security plan is to coordinate security plan-
ning considerations with concurrent, yet independent, physi-
cal, and economic planning and development as well as social
and political policy decisions. The master programming
effort, for example, is an opportunity to enhance the securi-
ty of the LMA by incorporating security planning strategies
into the physical planning and development of the area and
by serving as a catalyst for the revitalization of the
surrounding communities.
The concept of the linkage between insitutional securi-
ty and neighborhood revitalization, although uncommon is not
novel. Throughout the country, there are precedents for
institutional involvement in community development as a
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means of enhancing the institution's security. Institutions
have come to realize that "they are not isolated islands,"
and that their destiny may be wrapped up in the destiny
of the community in which they are situated.
"The hospital is a community institution
and the services it renders to patients
are not delivered in a vacuum but in an
economic, political, social context. How
hospitals understand and relate to this
context may well determine their success 62
or failure during the 1980's.
Community stability and the quality of institutional
relations can be a direct determinant of the security of the
institution. According to Mr. M. Miller, security director
of Columbia University, New York, "a law enforcement program
is only as good as the local relations of the area it serves
... police departments which do not involve themselves with
community affairs have no basis of contact."
This institutional enlightened self-interest has pro-
moted institutional involvement with community economic
development programs, opportunity policy measures, provision
of free community medical services, joint institutional/
community security efforts, and the use of institutional
facilities by community groups, The investment in community
welfare does not necessitate major capital outlays. The
institutions generally prefer to assist community groups
6 2 Rondel, J.S., "Hospital is Catalyst for Revitalization,"
Hospitals, July 16, 1980, p. 83.
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through political support and the provision of the free con-
sulting services of their planners and architects.
6 3
A. General Recommendations
(1) A centralized security planning body should be esta-
blished to coordinate the inter-institutional and institu-
tional-community security planning. The expertise and
cooperation of officials and individuals involved in the
security planning process is required. These include: the
institutional administrators -- management and policy makers
and their respective security directors, planners and archi-
tects, the high school administrators, city agencies (planners
and police), as well as members of the local community groups
64
and the medical community.
(2) Active participation of high level administrators is
necessary to establish the institution's commitment to
improved institutional-community relations. Institutional
dealings with the community must be sincere and straight-
6 3 For a detailed account of institutional/community security
involvement, see appendix 2, pp. 87-97.
6 4 The response of a CHMC nurse to the question of whether LMA
security services were adequate was, "Security? What secu-
rity?" This demonstrates the need for a dialogue between
members of the medical commmunity and those in charge of
security planning.
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forward, or they will fail and turn counterproductive.
For example, the Detroit Medical Center has made a strong
commitment to high level official representation incommunity
affairs. The director of Operations sits on the Community
Organization Boards, and is the current vice chairman of two
of the committees. Dr. Heisell, Director of John Hopkins
Medical Institute, has personally cultivated working rela-
tionships with the surrounding black communities and its
political leaders. 66
Specific recommendations are provided for in Exhibits
15-19.
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Meyers, E.M. and I.S. Fink, Universities and Communities:
Can They Plan Together?, University of California, Berkeley
1974.
66See appendix, p. 89.
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B. Exhibits of Specific Recommendations
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Exhibit 15
OFFENDERS
Strategy (Approach, Time Frame) Example/Reference
Reducing frequency of crime committed by
offenders from English High by:
1. educational reform - to be administered Conrad, in "Educational Intervention as
by the high school educators and coun- a Preventative Measure," recommends
selors. that changing the attitude and behavior
(corrective, long-term) of delinquency prone children requires
specific intervention which should
occur in the school setting. 67
c 2. punitive measures - to be applied by criminal justice experts recommend that
high school administration; to be juveniles be kept out of the criminal
applied, in the last resort, by arrest justice system as much as possible, in
and conviction. order to prevent recidivism. This is
based on the assumption that "the
further an offender penetrates into the
criminal justice system, the more dif-
ficult it becomes to divert him from
a criminal career. 68
Reduce the opportunities for crime:
see following strategies (see exhibits
16-19).
Reduce the motivations for crime of offen-
ders and potential offenders residing in
the surrounding neighborhoods via:
1. indirect corrective aspects of neigh- environmental and opportunity policy
borhood revitalization efforts. measures via community economic develop-
(corrective/environmental design, long- ment, housing rehab., employment pro-
term) grams created by joint institutional-
community efforts. 69
2. indirect corrective aspects of employ- employment programs for neighborhood
ment programs within the LMA institu- residents -- programs for public
tions housing residents to be supplemented
(corrective, long-term) by training in the English language. 7 0
recreation programs for neighborhood
youth. 71
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Exhibit 15
JOURNEY TO CRIME
Strategy (Approach, Time Frame) Example/Reference
Increase the journey to crime by:
1. tightening access control to semi- e.g.,- target hardening measures, pass
private and private zones system, blocking of escaper routes.
(mechanical, short-term) To be applied to areas such as Beth
Israel parking lot and Boston Latin
High School.
Increase the journey to crime by:
1. upgrading the neighborhood via com- as a result, the neighborhoods no longer
munity irmrovement programs. serve as a haven for resident offenders
(environmental design, intermediate) from other parts of the city.
4J
W:
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Exhibit 17
TARGETS
Strategy (Approach, Time Frame) Example/Reference
Reduce the vulnerability of targets by:
1. modifying victim behavior through seminars on self-protection; classes
crime prevention education. in self-defense; newsletter distribu-
(corrective, short-term) ting pertinent LMA security informa-
tion. 72
2. modification of institutional policies free nighttime parking in institutional
which contribute to the vulnerability facilities. 73
of potential victims.
(mechanical, short-term)
1. support of community crime prevention IMA political support to rally city
education programs. police assistance; 74(mechanical, short term) otherwise, lecturing by LMA security
personnel.
C
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Exhibit 18
NATURAL SURVEILLANCE
Strategy (Approach, Time Frame) Example/Reference
Enhancement of the natural surveillance
in the LMA via:
1. alteration of current impediments to Winsor School fence (pp. ) land-
natural surveillance. scaping - Emmanual campus; low lighting
(environmental deisgn, short-term) levels - Avenue Louis Pasteur, other
parts of the LMA.
2. the aplication of security plannina development of the Winsor/Temple lot
considerations to future physical on Pilgrim Road; Shattuck Street; - to
design and development. be applied throughout the medical area
(environmental design, intermediate) physical planning.
c
3. generation of street activity via out- e.g., street vendors, outdoor recreation
door activity programming. programs.
3 (environmental design, short-term)
Enhance the natural surveillance of the throughout the communities adjacent to
neighborhood via neighborhood revitali- the LMA, particularly along the Hunting-
zation programs. ton edge, Brigham Circle.
(environmental design, intermediate) Note: neighborhood confidence in in-
stitutional commitment to assist the
community currently residing in the
area to rehabilitate their community
and maintain their residency in the
area is a crucial factor in determining
community cooperation. 75
C
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Exhibit 19
ORGANIZED SUFIEILLANCE
Strategy (Approach, Time Frame) Example/Reference
Increase the crime prevention (deterrence) upgrading the caliber and training of
and law enforcement (apprehension) abili- organized security forces; increased
ties of the institutional private security inter-institutional coordination and
forces. cooperation -- coordinated external
(mechanical, short-term) patrols, central dispatch system, cen-
tral LMA security department.
Improve relations and cooperation with in efforts to upgrade security at other
local and state police. institutions, an emphasis was placed
(mechanical, short/intermediate) on maintaining close ties with local
police departments. 76
Increased organized surveillance via:
1. political support to increase city The Boston Fenway Program assisted the
police protection. Fenway Community in organizing a city
(mechanical, short-term) team policing unit in the neighborhood.
The community/police monthly meetings -are
subsidized by the Boston Fenway Pro-
gram. 77
2. joint institutional - community security support of community crime prevention
efforts. programs -- fiscal, technical, alloting
(mechanical, short-term) the community office space to utilize
as a headquarters; joint patrols. 78
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Strategy to Reduce Crime, U.S. Department of Justice, Law
Enforcement Agency Administration, 1973, p. 34.
6 9 See appendix, p.
p.
p.
p.
89,
89,
92,
97,
JHMI: activities - #3.
t "f 
- #9.
DMC : " - #1.
Montefiore: " - #2.
7 0See appendix,
7 1See appendix,
72
See appendix,
S3ee appendix,
p. 90, JHMI:
p. 97, Montefiore:
p.
p.
p.
89,
93,
95,
p. 91,
p. 93,
JHMI:
DMC :
Temple:
- #4.
- #3.
i
Public
- #9.
- #4.
Relations.
JHMI: Public Relations.
DMC : Security Measures.
7 4See footnote 7.
75 Kohn, I.R., Citizen Involvement in Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design, draft, Westinghouse Electric Corpor-
ation, 1974.
76
See appendix, p. 90, JHMI: Structure of the New Security
Force, #2.
p. 93, DMC Structure of the Security
Force, #3.
77
The Boston Fenway Program is a planning body formed by 11
major institutions in the Fenway Area, Boston, to improve
the security of the Fenway area, and plan for institutional
development and neighborhood revitalization. As a result
of their security planning efforts, crime rose only 3.6%
in the BFP target area as compared with an average of 7.6%
for all of Boston. The Boston Fenway Program, Inc., Report
to the Annual Meeting, 1980.
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III. Conclusion
A significant result of this thesis is the substanti-
ation, through the examination of the security in the Long-
wood Medical Area and its surroundings, of the theories of
the still developing discipline of environmental security
planning. This includes the theories of natural and orga-
nized surveillance as crime deterrents, critical intensity
zones, and the journey to crime.
The study of the LMA indicates that its poor security
image is balanced by the current security measures and the
prestige of the institutions. However, the marketability
of the LMA as a desirable workplace and healing center could
be jeopardized if measures are not taken to improve existing
conditions.
Current security planning strategies adopt a monolithic
approach to crime prevention -- the utilization of target
hardening techniques and organized surveillance limited to
the defined boundaries of the LMA.
The case study demonstrates the need for a synoptic
approach to crime prevention, one which plans for the
security of the complex in the context of its surroundings
and which utilizes strategies directed at the various crime-
analysis components contributing to the opportunities and
motivations for crime.
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The inter-institutional and joint-institutional comn-
munity planning required to implement the environmental
security planning programs, however, are constrained by
fiscal, administrative, functional, and political concerns.
Some of the constraints can be overcome by institutional
community programs which are not necessarily costly and may
be some of the most fruitful methods to promote institu-
tional security. This interaction could also be furthered
by the establishment of a nation-wide networks between
institutions- regarding institutional-community security
planning efforts. Such widespread institutional cooperation
would be a valuable extension of the synoptic approach.
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1. Tabular Review of Surveys
Measuring Avoidance Behavior
Dubow, F. et al., Reactions to Crime, U.S. Department,
of Justice.
Survey Responses on Places Avoided
Percentage
Reporting
Avoidance
'77
67
66
52
44
42
36
20
15
15
8
4
Type of Population Surveyed
black adults in household of 17 year old
boys in Philadelphia
15 police beats in Kansas City
state-wide Michigan
Detroit Metropolitan Area
residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant, New
York
elderly residents of central city low rent
public housing
8 LEAA high impact cities victimization
surveys
8 LEAA high impact cities victimization
surveys
national victimization survey
state-wide survey, Maryland
target area and general survey of
Cincinnati
4 areas of Portland
Reference
Savitz et al., 1977
Kelling et al., 1974
MOR, 1977
ISR, 1975
Kleinman and David.
1973
Lawton et al., 1976
Garofalo, 1977c
Garofalo, 1977c
Ennis, 1967
Nehnevajsa and Karelitz
1977
Schwartz and Clarren,
1978
Yaden et al., 1973
Question Wording
make more effort to avoid subways than
before
avoided some parts of the city b/c of fear
of victimization
there were some places they would not
go because of crime
avoid going downtown
avoid certain neighborhood streets
avoid certain locations in the
neighborhood
won't go certain places in the
metropolitan area at night
won't go places in the metropolitan area
in the daytime
didn't go somewhere wanted to b/c it was
unsafe
avoid some parts of their neighborhood
and/or the city-open-ended
stay out of parts of city-open-ended
avoid certain areas of town--open-ended
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2. Case Studies of Institutional-
Community Security Efforts:
John Hopkins Medical Center, Baltimore
Detroit Medical Center, Detroit
Temple University, Philadelphia
Montefiore Hospital, Bronx, New York
88
78
The following case studies summarize the security
efforts and community interface activities of four medical
and educational institutional complexes, selected for their
relevance as anaolgous experiences to the situation the
Longwood Medical Area faces. They are presented as models
for MASCO personnel and members to learn and benefit from.
The cases include:
John Hopkins-Medical Institute
Detroit Medical Center
Temple University
Montefiore Hospital
Certain commonalities of outlook and experience among
them can be outlined as follows:
- Institutional action on community welfare is a matter of
enlightened self interest, promoted by a fear of growing
community violence and unrest, often triggered by a major
confrontation with the community.
- Institutional dealings with the community must be sincere
and straightforward, or they will fail and turn counter-
productive.
- The progress of community relations should be expected to
be very slow.
- Initiatives for community interaction must come from the
top administrative level of the institutions.
- Security expenditures, if spent for quality personnel,
have produced significant reductions in are crime.
7 8 The case studies are excerpted from the Arrowstreet Master-
programming Proposal Manual. The research of the studies
was instigated and conducted by the author.
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JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICAL INSTITUTE (JHMI)
Context
The Institution: Johns Hopkins Medical Institute, located in
East Baltimore, is composed of the School of Medicine, The
Johns Hopkins Hospital, and the School of Public Health.
The Neighborhood: The institute is surrounded by two dis-
tinct neighborhoods and serves as a buffer zone between them.
To the north lies a very poor black slum, the recipient of
urban renewal program efforts of the city. To the south-
west, resides a mixed white and ethnic lower-middle and
lower-income population. This area is undergoing rehabili-
tation efforts.
Insitutional/Community Interface
Background: The riots of the late sixties which focused
around the Johns Hopkins area were the impetus for a con-
certed effort by the medical center to improve its relation-
ships with the surrounding communities and to resolve the
deep-seated mistrust and hostility toward the institutions.
Informal and Formal Interface: Dr. Heisell, Director of the
Institute, has cultivated working relationships with the
black community and political leaders. A sub-committee of
4 trustees selected from the joint board of trustees of
the Hopkins' Institutes (each institute is a separate corpo-
ration) has been formed to actively pursue community develop-
ment opportunities. A Hopkins' representative is a member
of the South East Community Housing Board.
Activities: JHMI has been involved in the following commu-
ty-oriented efforts:
1. Establishment of the East Baltimore Medical Center, a
community-run HMO, subsidized and staffed by the Medical
Center. JHMI has maintained a low profile to encourage
a sense of community ownership and responsibility for
survival of the clinic.
2. Provision of free medical care to the poor of the sur-
rounding communities via a $10 million annual write-off:
$7 million in bad debts, $3 million in free work.
3. Rehabilitation of deteriorating housing stock. Develop-
ment of mixed-income, partially-subsidized housing, to
be sold primarily to JHMI staff. The project is coordi-
nated with the South East Community Organization, the
city, and private developers.
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4. Conscientious efforts to employ staff from the neighbor-
ing communities.
5. Involvement with community and city-wide employment pro-
grams.
6. Community involvement and consultation prior to all
JHMI projects which impact the surrounds (e.g., consul-
tation prior to reorganization of security forces.)
7. Cooperative programming and provision of assistance to
local high school specializing in health care profession
training.
8. Creation of adolescent pregnancy clinic.
9. Neighborhood sports program run by medical students.
10. Community functions conducted on medical center grounds.
Security
Background: The murder of a Johns Hopkins medical student
three years ago led to the complete restructuring of the
JHMI security force. JHMI's strong commitment to security
has yielded successful results: In 1980, crime rates rose
43% throughout the city of Baltimore, but only 9% in the
medical area.
Structure of the Old Security Force: A contract security
service, with guards paid a minimum wage ($3.50 approx.),
and with a management overhead fee paid to the company.
The guards had minimum skills, and turnover rate was high
(50 out of 250 per month). The quality of supervision varied
with supervision at the bottom being the poorest of all.
Structure of the New Security Force: A second contract ser-
vice was chosen over an in-house staff since all hospital
staff is unionized, and the cost was considered prohibitive.
JHMI worked closely with the new contractor to develop the
desired security operation.
The annual security budget was doubled (to $3 million dollars).
The wage rate of a guard was raised to $5.75/hour. The
guards are well trained and responsible; many are ex-police-
men. Loyalities are to JHMI and not to the contract service.
There is virtually no turnover (only a weeding out process
of 8/200 men/month). Nine of the twelve supervisors are
retired policemen. The Head Superviosr was the Lieutenant
of Police of the City of Baltimore. As a result, the rela-
tions with the city police are excellent. An additional
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service of police patrolling has been contracted. Police-
men on foot patrol the area from 6 a.m. - 12 p.m. Their
wage is $6.75/hour. There is a waiting list of policemen
for these positions.
Security Measures: The central communications office moni-
tors the closed circuit TV installed at key points of exit
and entry (screens are triggered by movement on the pre-
mises thus minimizing visual-monitoring fatigue), answers
the phones and radios. When the additional policemen (who
are armed; JHMI security force is not) work in the area,
they tie into the centralized communications system.
An escort service van circulates on a designed route. Em-
ployees can signal it on the road with an I.D. The van waits
till an employee is in her/his car if car is parked on the
street. Individual escorts are available upon request.
Employees and visitors are encouraged at night to use the
parking garages, which are free of charge after 5 p.m., as
opposed to parking on city streets. The garages are con-
nected to the buildings via second-level walkways, and are
heavily monitored during shift changes.
Passes are issued to visitors to the Institute by a security
guard.
Public Relations and Community Concerns: A committee com-
posed of administrators, doctors, nurses, and staff persons
convene monthly to review the security issues affecting the
Medical Center Community and make recommendations for future
services. They are also in charge of public relations
efforts, and publish security news in the medical center
newsletter.
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DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER
Context
The Institutions: The Detroit Medical Center located in
Downtown Detroit includes the following institutions:
Wayne State University Medical School,- United Hospital of
Detroit, Children's Hospital of Michigan, The Rehabilitation
Institute, and Detroit General.
The Neighborhood: The medical center is surrounded by a
predominantly black, very poor community. A public housing
project is located on one of its borders.
Institutional/Community Interface
Background: Detroit Medical Center's efforts in community
involvement date back to 1955, when the Citizens Committee
was formed and a comprehensive master plan for the medical
area developed. Coupled with the urban renewal plan slated
for the surrounding communities, this has formed the base-
line for redevelopment in the area over the years. Today,
the Committee, now known as the Detroit Medical Center Cor-
poration, continues its comprehensive planning efforts with
the community. It has taken many long years of effort and
good will to partially mitigate the deep-rooted anger and
mistrust the community has felt toward the medical center,
and to build a viable working relationship.
Formal Interface: DMC has made a strong commitment to high
level official representation in community affairs. The
Director of Operations sits on Community Organization Boards,
and is the current vice chairman of two of the committees.
Activities
1. Provision of free professional consulting services to
the communities. The DMC architect/planner has rendered
services to community groups throughout the years, at the
cost of the medical center. Although communities may
be organized, they often require assistance in defining
their needs and setting a course of programmatic actions
to follow. Although DMC does not, as a rule, contribute
funding to the community programs, it helped bring a sub-
sidized housing project to fruition by assisting in loan
and land purchase negotiation.
2. Access to facilities of the medical center, such as use
of office space for meetings, use of printing facilities
of the graphic arts department at no cost, etc.
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3. Employment of neighborhood youth during summer months.
4. Work with police on youth programs.
5.. Coordination with local vocational high school speciali-
zing in laboratory services.
Security
Structure of the -Security Force: Though each institution
maintains its own in-house security force, there is close
coordination between the units, particularly with regard to
outdoor patrols. A central communication system is in opera-
tion.
The majority of guards are retired policemen, who exhibit
their experience and professionalism. When hiring younger
guards, DMC selects those with police academy training. The
guards are full-time employees receiving relatively high
wages (approximately $6-$7 an hour), with full benefits.
DMC is strongly against contract services, which were found
to provide poorly trained, unreliable guards, with high
turnover.
The security force is armed. Wayne State University's secur-
ity force is deputized and has the power of arrest and the
right to ticket. There are also close ties with the Detroit
city police. The City Police Precinct Commander sits on the
DMC security committee which meets quarterly. A special
city police car has been assigned to the area to patrol
daily between 3 and 11 p.m., and ties into the central
communication system.
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TEMPLE UNIVERSITY
Context
The Institution: Temple University in Philadelphia, is
composed of five campuses with a student enrollment of
34,000. Temple University Hospital serves both as a leading
referral center for the Delaware Valley as well as a provider
of medical care for the North Philadelphia Community.
Temple is the largest employer in North Philadelphia, with
9,840 employed at the University and its Hea-lth Science
Center.
The Neighborhood: Pressure from the neighboring black com-
munity in the late 60's led to major adjustments in the
campus development process, and resulted in a commitment
to increased neighborliness and the return of 12 acres of
land originally slated for university development. These
agreements were formalized in the Community-Temple Agree-
ment of 1970, signed also by the Governor of Pennsylvania,
the Mayor of Philadelphia, and other public officials. The
Agreement outlines the extent of community involvement in
the planning process preceeding any capital improvement de-
cisions contemplated by the university.
Formal Interface: The Director of the Office of Community
Relations has met with community members on a regular basis
since 1972.
Activities: The Office of Community Relations is the admini-
strator and innovator of numerous university-communty ser-
vice programs. There are approximately 60 ongoing programs
including educational, health and social service, recreation-
al, and special enrichment programs. Examples include:
1. Department of Entrepreneurial Programs works with small
businesses in the area.
2. The Center for Social Change and Community Development
assists community groups in packaging development pro-
grams.
3. 20% of the university work/study financial aid funding is
funnelled through the Office of Community Relations. Thus,
students are able to earn their tuition, while contribu-
ting to community programs such as day care centers,
tutorials and urban planning projects.
4. A variety of medical services are offered to the communi-
ty via the Temple University Hospital and the School of
Medicine.
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5. Facilities such as conference centers, lecture halls and
recreational facilities may be scheduled for public and
community group use when not occupied by Temple programs.
6. Temple has assisted in the packaging of a community sub-
sidized housing project by providing seed money and
leverage to obtain loans.
Security
Structure of Security Force: The various university insti-
tutions maintain their own security forces, some of which
are armed. They coordinate with the city police as Temple
security does not have jurisdiction beyond its borders.
Innovative Programming: The Office of Community Relations
has recently won a grant from the Partnership Center in
Washington to develop a security network system between the
university, the city police and the housing authority. The
goal is mutual assistance through cooperative crime preven-
tion programming. The Office of Community Relations is con-
templating a "town watch" whereby an organized crime preven-
tion patrol of the public housing project might be linked up
to the university communication system.
Public Relations: The Office of Community Relations attempts
to utilize every possible potential for furthering its work
in assisting the surrounding communities: (1) Political ties
with the city are carefully cultivated. Temple officials
meet with the mayor on a bi-annual basis. (2) They attract
project funding from the public affairs departments of major
corporations such as Gulf Oil, Bell Telephone, the utilities,
prominent banks, etc. (3) Publications are distributed to
a range of city organizations, and involvements maintained
with organizations such as the United Way, UMCA, Boy Scouts,
etc.
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MONTEFIORE HOSPITAL
Context
The Institution: Montefiore is loc.ated in the Bronx, New
York City. It is affiliated with the Hospital of Albert
Einstein College of Medicine.
The Neighborhood: The surrounding neighborhood is under-
going transition: Previously a white, primarily Jewish and
Irish populace, the community is now largely black and
Hispanic. The attitude of the community towards the 1hospi-
tal is mixed: on the one hand there is an affinity for the
hospital as a provider of medical care; on the other hand,
it evokes anger as a large, expansionist enterprise, pollu-
ting the environment with smoke from its chimneys, and de-
livering "inadequate" service.
Institutional/Community Interface
Formal Interface: A community advisory board to the hospi-
tal is composed of 22 members, including representation
from the HSAs (Health Systems Agencies) for the Bronx. Four
members of the committee sit on the central advisory board
of the hospital.
Issues such as the hospital budget or plans for future deve-
lopment are discussed with the community advisory board.
Montefiore has found that this policy of open discussion and
disclosure of information has created a significant attitu-
dinal change on the part of the community towards the hospi-
tal and that in fact there have not been major controversies
regarding development plans since the formation of the board.
This process has been ongoing for 3 to 4 years, but it took
approximated 18 months before one could begin to perceive any
results.
Montefiore representatives participate in all community pub-
lic meetings with planning boards, religious groups, etc.
This involvement does not usually lead to concerted action
but allows for a high degree of visibility and the display
of the hospital's concern for the community's well-being.
However, if the institution is not sincere in its dealings,
the real motives are picked up immediately and this leads
to disastrous results.
Activities
1. The hospital contributes to the funding of small-scale
community projects, such as the recent contribution of
$1000 to the community safety patrol for the purchase
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of a patrol vehicle, As a rule, it prefers to offer
expertise and cooperative efforts as opposed to funding.
2. Neighborhood revitalization efforts. One of the districts
adjacent to Montefiore suffers from a dilapidated housing
stock. Three rehabilitation strategies have been adopted:
(1) the provisionof technical advice to local landlords
in acquiring second mortgages: (2) provision of techni-
cal assistance to residents wishing to form cooperatives;
(3) as a last resort, acquisition of deteriorated pro-
perty and renovation with the original tenants in place.
3. The hospital encourages people from the community to
apply for employment within the hospital. While they
are not given additional preference, neighborhood resi-
dents are made aware of all available job openings.
Security
The guards of the hospital are not armed, as Montefiore does
not wish to "turn the hospital into an armed camp." There
is coordination with city police, whose responsibility it is,
they believe, to handle the problems of New York City.
When dealing with the community groups on security matters,
the emphasis is on providing assistance while maintaining a
clear posture that the institution is not responsible for
security, nor does it intend to dictate to the community
what needs to be done.
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Interviews
1. Anderson, T.
2. Barton, J.
3.
4.
Barrow, K.
Beattie, D.
5. Connelly, J.
6. Conti, J.
7. Cotton, C.
8. Craig, G.
9. Dais, L.
10. Daniels, J.
11. Fowler, F.
12. Gaitner, R.
13. Hartman, F.
14. Jenks, P.
15. Katz, M.
16. Major, G.
- Director of Public Affairs and Community
Relations. Temple University, Philadel-
phia.
- planner, Neighborhood Development Agency,
City of Boston.
- Security Coordinator, MASCO (LMA).
- Security Director, Beth Israel Hospital
(LMA) .
- Security Director, New England Deaconess
Hospital (LMA).
- Security Director, Simmons College.
- Director, Boston Fenway Program.
- planner, architect, Detroit Medical Center.
- Director, Office of Public Affairs,
Columbia University, New York City.
- Security Director, Children's Hospital
Medical Center.
- Center for Survey Research, University
of Massachusetts, Boston.
- Director of Community Relations and
Public Affairs, Johns Hopkins Medical
Institute, Baltimore.
- Director, Hartford Institute of Criminal
Justice, Connecticut.
- President, Co-Generation Management
Company, Inc. (LMA) .
- Senior Deputy Director, Montefiore
Hospital, Bronx, New York City.
- Administrator, CentralSupport Services
Harvard Medical School, West Quad Admini-
stration (LMA) .
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17. Mickles, J.
18. Miller, M.
19. Nichols, R.
20. Norton, T.
21. Parks, T.
22. Speese, R.
23. Sharrat, J.
24. Sycamore, H.
25. Wall, P.
- Dean of Administration, Massachusetts
College of Pharmacy (LMA).
- Security Director, Columbia University,
New York City.
- Director of Area Services and Develop-
ment, MASCO (LMA).
- Metropolitan District Manager, First
Security.
- Acting Administrator, Roxbury Tenants
of Harvard, Boston.
- Director, Office of Community Relations,
Detroit Medical Center.
- Principal, John Sharrat and Associates,
Architects and Planners.
- Assistant Director, New England Deaconess
Hospital (LMA).
- Manager of Plant Services, MASCO (LMA).
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